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Abstract
Traditionally, the role of midwives has been to be with women throughout the pregnancy continuum, from
conception until the end of the postnatal period. Midwives, however, have been named as key providers of
abortion services. While freedom of conscience is legally protected within Europe, discrepancies exist
between midwifery and conscientious objection to abortion-related services. Midwives are largely ignored
within the academic discussion despite the care and support they give to women undergoing abortions.
Those discrepancies led to the aim of this article to address this issue by discussing some of the key ethical
and legal concepts that are relevant to midwives’ role in the provision of abortion services.
This article shows that the decision to provide or object to abortion services remains ethically very
complex because arguments exist both for and against its provision. Being with women can be interpreted
differently and individual situations of care are multifaceted. Conscientious objection to abortion services is
a highly contentious issue that has an overall importance to midwives. Noting that decisions are individual,
may change or may be situationally dependant; a definitive position of midwives for or against conscientious
objection cannot be assumed.
Respecting conscience and acknowledging that there are various arguments for and against
conscientious objection promotes widespread understanding. It accommodates both the opportunity for
midwives to object on conscience grounds to the provision of abortion services and respect women’s
autonomy so that mutual agreement may be reached on issues that may have far reaching consequences.
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Introduction
The ethical issue of conscientious objection has been in existence for over a century, first coming to
prominence in a 19th-century UK parliamentary debate concerning compulsory vaccination, where its
naming was hotly challenged but ultimately included in the law.1 In this instance, it was parents rather
than professionals who were allowed to exercise their consciences as to whether or not to have their children
vaccinated.
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Currently, a major subject of debate is that around the provision of abortion services and the related care
of the women concerned. This debate is expanding internationally with both the provision of the service and
health professionals’ rights to make an objection to its provision being highly contentious issues.2,3 Con-
scientious objection to providing abortion services describes the situation when health-care professionals
decline to participate in the abortion process on conscience grounds.4 Many articles both for and against
conscientious objection have been published in the academic literature.2 However, these have mainly been
restricted to articles concerning the medical or legal professions with little attention being given to others
such as midwives.
Despite midwives being designated by the World Health Organization as key providers of abortion
services,3 and the legal protection afforded to freedom of conscience within Europe,5 few articles even
mention them.2 However, legal and professional consequences for midwives, exercising a conscientious
objection to participation in abortion services, have been documented throughout Europe,6 including some
prominent legal cases that reached the highest courts in at least two countries, United Kingdom7 and
Sweden.8,9 The aim of this article is thus to address this issue by discussing some of the key ethical and
legal concepts that are relevant to midwifery practice. The role of the midwife is discussed first in order to
contextualise the discussion.
Expanding the scope of midwifery practice
Traditionally, the role of midwives has been to be with women throughout the pregnancy continuum, from
conception until the end of the postnatal period.10 In some countries, this means that midwives hold the
prime responsibility for women whose journeys are considered to be ‘normal’. Conversely, women with
pre-existing pathologies, or who develop complications during the course of the journey, should always be
the responsibility of a medical practitioner.11 However, in the latter case, midwives are still required to ‘be
with’ women so that they may provide emotional and professional support even though they are not
following a normal trajectory.
In the last few years, some midwives have developed specialist niches for themselves such as working
with women who are drug or alcohol dependent, are refugees, are pregnant in early teenage years or are
living in poverty. These midwives have advanced skills in their specific areas and, while being the main
point of contact for the women concerned,12 are often working in close cooperation with senior medical
practitioners.11 When the World Health Organization (WHO) named midwives as among the key providers
of abortions,3 this appeared as another extension to the midwife’s traditional role. However, for a midwife to
be with women undergoing abortions, a different set of skills is required because of the deliberate working
towards the premature termination of the pregnancy. In this context, the term ‘being with women’ is seen as
a dynamic, challenging and developing construct. The underlying professional philosophy means it is
essential for a midwife to respect and support women in their individual needs and wishes during the
childbirth continuum.13 Therefore, a midwife who chooses to embrace the expanded role of abortion
provider, must be able to support the woman with ‘respectful maternity care’.14
For decades, it has been discussed that midwives take over sole responsibility for providing first trimester
abortion services.15 In abortions taking place after the first trimester, midwives may be called upon to work
with the women by administering the abortifacient drugs, accompanying the women during their labours,
counselling women during their decision making processes or delivering the foetus and placenta.16,17 Their
role, while physiologically paralleling that of an induced labour, involves the provision of a different kind of
support. Qualitative findings suggest that women undergoing a second trimester abortion, have distinctive
preferences and very specific emotional needs.18 This includes being ‘affirmed as moral decision-makers’,
being ‘able to determine their degree of awareness during the abortion’ and having ‘care provided in a
discrete manner to avoid being judged by others for having an abortion’.19
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The above insights illustrate that ‘being with women’ undergoing a late abortion requires the midwife to
support them in their individual situations. However, these needs can only be met by midwives who feel
able to be with women in those situations. If midwives feel in conflict with their own conscience, they may
not be a help to women undergoing abortions because of their emotional distance. It is such situations that
give rise to claims of conscientious objection, which may be particularly relevant in relation to midwives’
respect for women’s needs. We discuss some of the ethical concepts from the literature that midwives
confronted with such dilemmas may wish to consider.
Conscience
What is conscience?
The concept of conscience and conscientious objection is highly relevant within pluralistic societies and
ethically complex situations, such as those existing in health care.20 As long ago as the thirteenth century,
the theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas,21 focused one of his questions on conscience deducing
that conscience determines that an act takes place in three ways: as witness that something was done or not
done, as judgement as to whether something should or should not have been done or as an assessment of
whether something was well or badly done.
It is the second of Aquinas’ principles that is highly relevant to midwifery practice in relation to
abortions. In the context of the medical profession, Pellegrino22 referred to this stating that judgements
of conscience are morally binding and must be followed, otherwise the person concerned would have
behaved immorally. He also cautioned that while the application of conscience ‘may be in error about the
facts, to ignore it may induce lasting feelings of guilt, remorse and shame’. Pellegrino further notes that both
parties are entitled to respect for their personal autonomy as ‘all humans, ethicists included, possess an inner
conviction of what is right and wrong and feel compelled to act in accord with that judgement’. Pellegrino’s
explanations are equally relevant to midwives. Sepper23 acknowledged the multi-faceted nature of con-
science, noting in the title Not only the doctor’s dilemma that conscience is not restricted solely to the
medical profession. The importance of conscience is closely related to an individual’s moral integrity or
sense of self and pointed out that, although some people are more conscientious than others, everyone has a
conscience, thereby bringing its complexity to the fore. The seminal work of Wicclair,24 for example,
provides a balanced overview between conscience and the duty to provide care. Wicclair’s work has
underpinned other ethics discussions in law, philosophy and medicine because it proposes that the most
promising ethical justification to conscientious objection is respect for moral integrity. However, some
authors argue that the core ethical values on which decisions are based need to correspond with one or more
core values in medicine.25–27 Wicclair’s work lacks consideration of the specific situations of midwives’
and other health professionals’ specific needs. However, Fleming et al.2 documented in their systematic
review that midwives’ voices were notably absent.
Many commentators challenge the rights of health care professionals to allow their private values to
interfere with their work.28–30 Others have proposed criteria for conscientious objection substituting respon-
sibilities which they believe compensate for taking this stance.31,32
Accommodating conscience
International protection has been afforded to conscience since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
of 1947.33 The European Convention of Human Rights, takes up the text in Article 9:
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Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion . . . Freedom to manifest one’s religion or
beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.5
The Council of Europe later specified the right to conscientious objection to abortion in Resolution 1763:
No person, hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any manner because of a
refusal to perform, accommodate, assist or submit to an abortion, the performance of a human miscarriage, or
euthanasia or any act which could cause the death of a human foetus or embryo, for any reason.34
The wording used by the Council is not restricted only to medical practitioners, and its clear statement is
applicable to midwives and others, including institutions as a whole.
Wicclair24 recommended accommodating conscience but warned that there is no simple formula for so
doing. Sepper35 agreed but took a broader perspective, noting that freedom of conscience is highly relevant
for societies because of its links to freedom, tolerance and understanding.
While individuals may disagree over fundamental questions of morality, each person utilises their
conscience in determining the morality of their own actions. The protection of conscience provides respect
for various possible perspectives, which on the first view seem to be mutually incompatible. This was
reiterated by Sulmasy36 who petitioned for tolerance, professional judgement and respect for the discre-
tionary space of the physician. His view of conscientious objection to abortion in medicine proposed that
abortion might be immoral for one person while it might be morally permissible for another stating:
Both ought humbly to acknowledge the fallibility of their positions and their inability to persuade each other of
the truth of these positions, but this need not mean that one must conclude that neither position is true or that
moral truth is subjective.
Widely diverging views have been articulated by Pellegrino22 who considered freedom of conscience as a
moral right and Fiala and Arthur37 who classified conscientious objection as ‘dishonourable disobedience’
and as ‘unethical refusal to treat’. Furthermore, Liberman38 stated that conscientious refusals in health care
can even be ‘moral wrongness’ and Pellegrino noted, ‘both the physician and the patient as human beings
are entitled to respect for their personal autonomy. Neither one is empowered to override the other. The
protection of freedom of conscience is owed to both’.22 Sepper,35 in keeping with Aquinas, added that it is
the process of attempting to do what individuals perceive to be correct, rather than the outcome that provides
a justification for protecting freedom of conscience. Addressing the complexity of conscientious objection
in medicine, Sepper also advocated those involved should have the wisdom to defuse conflict situations by
leaving space for conducting ethical conversations. This is something that still needs to be done in mid-
wifery, as although the WHO has designated midwives as vital providers of the service, it also acknowl-
edges midwives as second level health professionals.3 Unless in independent practice, midwives are
afforded less opportunity to engage in such discussions as part of their normal working day. This matter
is discussed at length by Thompson39 who acknowledges, however that she is considering the personhood of
women rather than entering into the abortion debate.
Because the complexity of conscientious objection depends on moral principles as guiding decisions
either to commit or omit a particular act, related decisions are, as elucidated 700 years ago by Aquinas, more
than an application of rules.35,40 Harris40 spoke of a need for addressing not only conscientious objection
within the debate but also ‘conscientious commitment’ that expresses the deliberate intentions of abortion-
providers, Fovargue and Neal41 concurring but stressing that any objection must not address the individual
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woman but the treatment. From their perspective, each person’s own position must be open to differing
conscience-based conclusions of others.
In the midwifery community, with its much higher numbers of practitioners than in medicine, it may be
expected that wide ranging views will be held. In noting such a scenario, Sepper stressed that the complexity
of the topic requires conscience to be taken seriously, noting that a health care provider might be willing to
contribute in one circumstance and to refuse in another. While appearing to contradict the views of
Fovargue and Neal, the focus here is perhaps on the grounds for abortion and is directly applicable to
midwives. A midwife, for example, may be willing to provide the service if a woman has been subjected to
rape or with serious foetal abnormalities but not for other reasons. These arguments are supplemented with
an understanding that conscientious objection will remain an individual decision that can vary according to
different situations as the topic is complex and controversial. Noting that decisions are individual, may
change or may be situationally dependant, a definitive position of midwives for or against conscientious
objection cannot be assumed. This means that midwives who decide to object to the provision of abortion
services in some cases may argue differently in others by expressing a freedom of conscience within
everyday professional life. Whatever stance an individual midwife may take, she will be bound by the
laws of her country or professional codes of practice. These are discussed.
Conscience clauses
Many countries have so called ‘conscience clauses’ enacted in law that offer some protection to health
professionals, including midwives, who feel morally unable to provide abortion services on conscience
grounds. Within most European countries, conscience clauses allowing health professionals to abstain from
providing abortion related services are included in either specific legislation concerning abortion or
employment. In Germany, for example, the law on conflicts in pregnancies states that no one is obliged
to participate in abortion services,42 while the UK Abortion Act states ‘no person shall be under any duty,
whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any treatment authorised
by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection’.4 The recently enacted law in the Republic of Ireland,
rather than adopting a generalist approach, names specific health professionals, including midwives, in its
clause on conscientious objection: ‘Nothing in this Act shall be construed as obliging any medical practi-
tioner, nurse or midwife to carry out, or to participate in carrying out, a termination of pregnancy . . . to
which he or she has a conscientious objection’.43
Other countries, such as Croatia, do not have a universal law. Instead the legislation on conscientious
objection is linked to individual professions, with doctors being regulated by the Law on Medical Practice:
Because of their ethical, religious or moral belief or beliefs, doctors have the right to assert a conscientious
objection and refuse to conduct diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation of the patient, if doing so does not conflict
with the rules of the profession, and if it does not cause permanent damage to the health of or threaten the life of a
patient.44
The Nursing Act allows conscientious objection for nurses:
Because of their ethical, religious or moral belief or beliefs, nurses have the right to assert conscientious objection
and refuse to conduct medical/nursing care if doing so does not conflict with the rules of the profession, and if it
does not cause permanent damage to the patient’s health or endanger the patient’s life.45,46
As yet, however, there is no specific midwifery legislation meaning that a midwife may be forced into
providing abortion services against her own conscience such as was the case with Jaga Stojak.6 This is
different from France, for example, where: ‘No midwife is obliged to participate in a voluntary abortion’.47
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Each of these laws has in common that, unless there is a critical risk of death for the woman, no one can be
forced to provide abortion services. On this legal level, the debate concerning conscientious objection is not
about ethical issues but generally bringing the European legislation to country level. The legislation may be
backed up by professional codes of practice or, where there is no legislation, these codes may provide the
only guidelines available.
Professional codes of practice
Several professional codes of practice exist, which vary in their position and supporting arguments. Here,
midwives are not well served as, despite the WHO’s reference to midwives as key providers of abortion
services,3 most well-developed professional codes of practice are applicable to the medical profession and
have been drafted by their various professional bodies. The International Federation of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists’ resolution on conscientious objection acknowledged that practitioners ‘have a right to
respect for their conscientious convictions both not to undertake and to undertake the delivery of lawful
services’48 and their position statement on conscientious objection to abortion further specified: ‘Practi-
tioners have a right to respect for their conscientious convictions in regard to both undertaking and not
undertaking the delivery of lawful procedures, and not to suffer discrimination on the basis of their
convictions’.49
However, midwifery’s comparable organisation, the International Confederation of Midwives (ICM),
appears to ignore the issue despite the latest update of its essential competencies for midwifery practice.50 In
this document, competency 1e states ‘[midwives must] uphold fundamental human rights when providing
midwifery care’ and listed under this is knowledge of law. Similarly, competency 2i declares that a midwife
must ‘provide care to women with unintended or mistimed pregnancy’ wherein a midwife is expected to
have knowledge of options for abortion and the use of appropriate medications as well as the risks of unsafe
abortion. In addition, ‘midwives who have to implement certain skills’ are to
prescribe, dispense, furnish or administer drugs according to the scope of practice and protocol (however
authorized to do so in the jurisdiction of practice in dosages appropriate to induce medication abortion) and
perform manual vacuum aspiration of the uterus up to 12 completed weeks of pregnancy.
The ICM clearly supports the drive by WHO to cascade the role of primary provider of abortion services
from doctors to midwives. However, it is somewhat unexpected that a statement on conscientious objection
has not been published by midwifery’s international body. This is even more surprising when the modified
Delphi Study, on which the ICM competency on abortion is based, is considered. This study, administered
via the Internet, involved three rounds of data collection where 37 statements of abortion-related knowledge
and skill were presented. In addition, in-depth review of the literature was conducted that focussed on
relationship between maternal mortality and morbidity and access to safe abortion. This literature review
outlined a strong relation between global access to abortion and global maternal morbidity and mortality
rates.51
They reaffirmed the role of midwives in the provision of abortion-related services, including the pro-
vision of medical abortion, performance of vacuum aspiration, comprehensive counselling, referral for
abortion, the provision of post-abortion services and post abortion family planning. While the authors
respected conscientious objection as a possible stance of midwives who decided not to provide those
services, this finding from their study has not been translated into the ICMs’ essential competencies.
At country level, midwives are often also not clearly advised with regard to their legal rights. The Royal
College of Midwives in the United Kingdom makes it clear that all midwives should be prepared to care for
women undergoing abortions.52 It briefly states that the conscience clause in the 1967 Abortion Act allows
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them the right to object, cautioning that ‘this should only apply to direct involvement in the procedure of
terminating a pregnancy’. What constitutes ‘direct involvement’ is, however, far from clear despite a ruling
from the UK Supreme Court on a case concerning two midwives who held long-standing positions as
conscientious objectors and who held senior roles in the delivery unit of a hospital where mid trimester
abortions were carried out on a daily basis.7 In their findings, the judges ruled that the only part of their role
to be covered fully by the conscience clause, was being present to assist and support if medical intervention
were required.
The Northern Ireland Office has recently legalised abortion in line with the rest of the United Kingdom
but is currently in an ‘interim period’ during which consultation is being made on a variety of issues
including conscientious objection. During the consultation guidelines include those of the General Medical
Council and Nursing and Midwifery Council. This guidance is interesting because it respects and includes
some of the ethics based literature and it becomes clearer how conscientious objection could be applied to
practice.53 Those thoughts greatly impact on the present debate on conscientious objection and in particular,
how they are translated into practice by midwives. In Germany, for example, some midwives have recently
stated they have no choice because they feel under pressure to provide abortion services as this has been
delineated as a clear midwifery task.16 This is astonishing because as shown above, a conscience clause does
exist in Germany and it seems as if midwives are not aware of it. It thereby calls into question the motives of
those who claim that there is no choice and outlines lack of guidance by their professional associations.
Midwives who may wish to make a conscientious objection to participation in abortions services thus do not
always appear to have support from their professional organisations.
Conclusion
Conscientious objection has an overall importance to midwives which means that the midwife’s decision
either to provide or to object to the provision of abortion services should be respected. The above insights
offer understanding for different possible stances that midwives may decide to choose during their decision-
making processes when abortion services are requested. Different arguments are available for or against
conscientious objection, each of which contribute to an understanding that midwives can choose different
stances either to provide or to object to providing abortion services. This should occur without the profes-
sional sanctions that have happened in the past because the main task of midwives is care provision during
normal processes during the childbirth continuum.
It is critical to note, that midwives have been designated as main providers of abortion services because
both the process of abortion and the provision of emotional care differs completely from that required in the
physiological processes of normal birth. It seems as if this has come about as a means to overcome and cover
personnel shortages in the medical sector. The ICM’s rapid adjusting of their previously research based
‘Essential Competencies for Midwives’ has further contributed to the aforementioned feelings of coercion.
For midwives to feel valued and included they need to be called upon to contribute to further discussions.
Conscientious objection to the provision of abortion services is important for midwives because it
respects midwives’ internal values and the espoused values of the profession. An ongoing debate is needed
within the complex field of midwifery and conscientious objection to abortion services as to how this can be
realised in practice according to the law. Women seeking abortion-services may also benefit from con-
scientious objection because this ensures that they will be cared for by midwives who consciously provide
the necessary emotional and physical care needed. Respecting conscience and acknowledging that there are
various arguments for and against conscientious objection develops an understanding, that both accom-
modates the opportunity for midwives to object on conscience grounds to the provision of abortion services
and respect women’s autonomy so that mutual agreement can be reached on issues that may have far
reaching consequences.
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